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Abstract
This paper proposes simple tax policies that can alleviate the distortive effects
of royalties. We consider a Cournot duopoly under decreasing returns where
one of the firms has a patented technology that it can license to its rival using
combinations of royalties and fixed fees. Under optimal licensing policies for
the patentee, stronger diseconomies of scale result in lower market prices. It is
possible to construct tax-transfer schemes for the firms that are Pareto improving
as well as deficit neutral, i.e., these taxes lower market prices and collect sufficient
revenue to compensate firms for their losses from taxation without incurring any
deficit (JEL: D21, D43, D45, L13)
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1 Introduction
A patent grants an innovator monopoly rights over its innovation for a given period of time.
It seeks to provide incentives to innovate as well as to diffuse innovations. Since Arrow
(1962), it has been recognized that patents often create a conflict between private and social
incentives of innovation. An innovation that results in an efficient production technology may
not yield its full benefits to consumers due to distortions created by specific patent licensing
policies.1 In particular, if a patent holder is one of the incumbent firms in an oligopoly, it
has incentives to use royalties to license its innovation to its rivals (see, e.g., Shapiro, 1985;
Wang, 1998; Sen and Tauman, 2007). Royalties give competitive edge to the innovator, but
distort the innovation and lead to higher prices.2
In this paper we identify a situation where, with a patent system in place, the government
can adopt simple deficit-neutral policies that alleviate the distortions created by licensing
practices. These policies are based on quantity taxation to firms that lower market prices.
Furthermore, the revenue collected by the government is sufficiently high to compensate
firms for their losses due to taxation. As a result these policies strictly improve the welfare
of consumers as well as the firms in the market.
We carry out our analysis in a Cournot duopoly where the competing firms have a produc-
tion technology that exhibits decreasing returns to scale. One of the firms has a patent on a
cost-reducing technological innovation. The patent holder can either use the new technology
exclusively or license it to its rival by using combinations of upfront fees and royalties. The
starting point of our analysis is the characterization of optimal licensing policies. We show
that it is optimal for the patent holder to sell the new technology irrespective of the magni-
tude of innovation. Moreover, optimal policies always involve positive royalties.3 Royalties in
our model interact with decreasing returns to generate certain counter-intuitive effects which
are absent under constant returns. In particular, the rate of optimal royalty falls with the
strength of decreasing returns. As a result decreasing returns affect market price through two
channels. Higher decreasing returns have the direct effect of raising the price, but also have
the indirect effect of lowering royalties which reduces the price. We identify robust regions
where the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and consequently stronger decreasing
returns result in lower market price.
Consider the regions where stronger decreasing returns lead to lower price. Suppose the
1Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) first studied the problem
of patent licensing in oligopolies. Since then, the literature has been extended to address issues such
as informational asymmetries (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Choi, 2001), product differentiation (Muto,
1993; Faul´ı-Oller and Sandon´ıs, 2002; Colombo, 2012), incumbent innovators (Marjit, 1990; Wang,
1998; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2007), sequential competition (Filippini, 2005),
intertemporal aspects (Jensen, 1992; Avagyan et al., 2014) and vertical integration (Filippini and
Vergari, 2017). See Kamien (1992) and Bhattacharya et al. (2014) for surveys.
2Royalties often raise anticompetitive concerns in actual licensing practices. For instance, five wire-
less technology companies filed complaints at European Commission against their competitor Qual-
comm alleging that royalties charged by Qualcomm were “excessive and disproportionate” (Dombey
et al., 2005). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US recently investigated allegations that
use of high royalties by Google on some patents was slowing down its competitors (Morran, 2013).
One standard policy intervention to remedy the resulting inefficiency could be to provide either direct
or indirect subsidies to firms; however, fiscal constraints may prevent governments from following such
policies.
3In a duopoly with constant returns, it is not optimal for the patent holder to license innovations
that are drastic (i.e., innovations that are significant enough to create a monopoly), but non-drastic
innovations are licensed by using royalties (see Sen and Tauman, 2018).
2
government introduces a quantity tax on each firm which is increasing and convex in the
quantity it sells. As the marginal tax is increasing in quantity, this tax is “progressive”
in nature. The introduction of this tax effectively strengthens the magnitude of decreasing
returns for firms. Within the parametric configuration of the model, we show that it is
possible for the government to design this tax in a way that reduces the market price, but
doing so necessarily makes one or both firms worse off. However, the tax generates sufficient
revenue to compensate firms for their losses. This makes it possible to design tax and transfer
schemes (that is, taxation together with lump-sum transfers to firms) that make consumers
as well as the firms better off. The scheme finances itself and thus achieves deficit neutrality.
Although progressive income taxes are quite common in most countries, progressive corpo-
rate taxes are sometimes criticized to be anticompetitive. Royalties are generally considered
to be anticompetitive too. This paper shows that selective and prudent use of one anticom-
petitive instrument (progressive tax)4 may weaken the effect of the other one (royalty) and
lead to better market outcomes.
Our work is not the first that traces the unexpected impact of taxation in an oligopoly.
Studying commodity taxation in a vertical differentiated duopoly with endogenous quality,
Cremer and Thisse (1994) show that an ad valorem tax lowers the qualities of the products
in the market, which in turn lowers the cost of production and market prices. They also show
that there always exists a small ad valorem tax that can raise social welfare via redistribution
of the tax receipts. Along similar lines, de Meza et al. (1995) show that imposing an ad-
valorem tax in Cournot markets can reduce market prices. Their result is driven by the
presence of increasing returns to scale. The introduction of the tax induces some firms to
exit, allowing the remaining firms to exploit returns to scale so efficiently that the post-
tax price falls below the pre-tax level. By contrast, the exactly opposite factor—decreasing
returns to scale—drives our result.
This paper is also related to another strand of literature that looks at Pareto-improving
tax policies in economies with imperfectly competitive markets. Konishi et al. (1990) provide
welfare improving tax-transfer schemes in a general equilibrium model with one competitive
and one non-competitive production sector. Dille´n (1995) considers efficiency-restoring poli-
cies in a general equilibrium framework with imperfect competition. Ushio (2000) studies the
impact of small commodity taxes in a Cournot market. Wang (2018) shows that in economies
where all commodities are taxable, the optimal tax rates should equalize the Lerner indexes
of commodities.
Finally our paper is indirectly related to the literature on Pigouvian taxation (e.g., Pigou,
1932; Baumol, 1972; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) which studies the role of taxes in correcting
externalities generated by market activities. In a market where production results in negative
externalities, Carlton and Loury (1980, 1986) argue that imposition of a Pigouvian tax (that
is, a per unit tax) on firms leads to socially efficient outcome in the short run but a lump-
sum transfer is also required in the long run. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008) show
that in pure exchange economies with separable externalities, a tax-transfer scheme can be
used to Pareto improve upon competitive equilibria. In contrast to both of these papers, we
look at imperfectly competitive markets, so the choices of firms affect prices. Progressive
quantity taxes in our model “correct” the licensing contracts in a way which is beneficial for
consumers. Although we study the role of taxes in the context of technology transfer rather
than externalities, our paper shares the broad theme that taxes can be used to improve
market outcomes.
4There is a large literature on non-linear commodity taxes (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1976; Naito, 1999; Saez, 2002).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives optimal
licensing policies. Section 3 discusses the inverse relation between market price and decreasing
returns. Finally, Section 4 analyzes tax-transfer schemes and their welfare impact. All proofs
are placed in the Appendix.
2 The model
Demand: Consider a Cournot duopoly with firms 1 and 2. For i = 1, 2, let qi be the quantity
produced by firm i and let Q be the industry output, i.e., Q = q1 + q2. Denoting by p the
market price, the inverse demand function of the industry is p = max{a−Q, 0} where a > 0.
Cost: There is an existing technology under which both firms operate under the linear
marginal cost function
µ(q) = bq + c where 0 < c < a and b > 0 (1)
We assume that the fixed cost of production is 0. As µ(q) is increasing in q, the technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
New technology: One of the firms, say firm 1, is granted a patent for a new technology that
leads to a reduction in the production cost. Specifically the new technology results in the
marginal cost function
µε(q) = bq + c− ε where 0 < ε < c (2)
So ε is the magnitude of innovation.5
Licensing policies: The patent holder (firm 1) carries out its production with the new tech-
nology. It may also license the new technology to its rival firm 2. The set of licensing policies
available to firm 1 is the set of all combinations of a unit royalty6 r ≥ 0 and an upfront fee
α ≥ 0, so a typical policy is given by (r, α). If firm 2 does not have a license, its marginal cost
is µ(q). If it has a license under a policy (r, α), its effective marginal cost becomes µε(q) + r.
Assuming firm 2 will not accept a policy with r > ε, it is sufficient to consider royalties
r ∈ [0, ε].
The licensing game Gb: The strategic interaction between the two firms is modeled as an
extensive-form game Gb that has three stages. In the first stage, firm 1 decides whether
to license the new technology to firm 2 or not. If firm 1 licenses, it offers a policy (r, α)
where r ∈ [0, ε] and α ≥ 0. In the second stage, firm 2 decides whether to accept or reject
a licensing offer. In the third stage, the two firms compete in quantities. If firm 2 operates
under a policy (r, α) and produces q units, it pays rq + α to firm 1. We look at Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes of this game.
5We consider the innovation to be a downward shift of the marginal cost line which lowers c without
affecting the slope b. This makes our analysis comparable to the existing literature as by taking b = 0,
we have the standard case of constant returns.
6We look at unit royalties, that is, a licensee pays a royalty for each unit it sells. Studying patent
licensing with decreasing returns, Colombo and Filippini (2016) look at a larger class of royalty
contracts that include ad valorem and revenue-based royalties. They show that optimal kind of
royalty contracts depends on the extent of convexity of cost functions. Using the standard set of




We begin with the last stage of the game where firms compete as Cournot duopolists. If firm
2 does not have a license, the payoff of firm i is simply its profit in the Cournot duopoly.
Denote this profit by pii(q1, q2). Then
pii(q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)qi − [(c− ε+ (i− 1)ε]qi − bq2i /2, i = 1, 2 (3)
Denoting by pii(r, q1, q2) the duopoly profit of firm i when firm 2 has a license with rate of
royalty r,
pii(r, q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)qi − [c− ε+ (i− 1)r]qi − bq2i /2, i = 1, 2 (4)
When there is licensing the total payoff Π1 of firm 1 is the sum of its duopoly profit and
licensing revenue. For firm 2, note from (4) that royalty r is part of its marginal cost and
royalty payments are already included in its duopoly profit. So firm 2’s total payoff Π2 is its
duopoly profit net of fixed fees. So under a licensing policy (r, α), we have
Π1(r, α) = pi1(r, q1, q2) + rq2 + α, Π2(r, α) = pi2(r, q1, q2)− α (5)
To determine the SPNE of G, we need to consider Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes of the
Cournot duopoly where firms choose q1, q2 simultaneously and obtain profits given by (3)
or (4). Lemma A2 in the Appendix shows that this duopoly has a unique NE. Let q̂i, pii
denote the Cournot (NE) output, profit of firm i in the no-licensing case; let qi(r), pii(r) be
the corresponding expressions when licensing occurs under royalty r.
2.2 Technology transfer
Under a licensing policy (r, α), by (5) the payoffs are given by
Π1(r, α) = pi1(r) + rq2(r) + α, Π2(r, α) = pi2(r)− α
If firm 2 rejects the policy, it obtains pi2. Hence for any r ∈ [0, ε], it is optimal for firm 1
to set the fixed fee α = pi2(r) − pi2, making firm 2 just indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the licensing offer. Therefore, if firm 1 decides to offer a license, its problem reduces
to choosing r ∈ [0, ε] to maximize
Π1(r) = pi1(r) + rq2(r) + pi2(r)− pi2 (6)
The notion of drastic innovation will be useful to characterize optimal licensing policies.
A cost-reducing innovation is drastic (Arrow 1962) if it is significant enough to create a
monopoly whenever one firm only uses the new technology; otherwise it is non-drastic. An
innovation of magnitude ε is drastic if ε ≥ (b+1)(a−c) and it is non-drastic if ε < (b+1)(a−c)
(see Lemma A2 in the Appendix).
We are in a position to characterize SPNE of the game Gb. Towards this end, for b > 0
denote
`(b) := (b+ 1)2/(b3 + 5b2 + 7b+ 1) (7)
Note that 0 < `(b) < b+ 1 and `(b) is decreasing, with limb→∞ `(b) = 1.
Proposition 1 For any b > 0, the game Gb has a unique SPNE outcome. It has the following
properties.
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(I) Regardless of whether the innovation is drastic or non-drastic, licensing always occurs.
(II) Firm 2 always obtains the net payoff pi2 and it is just indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the licensing offer. This payoff is zero for drastic innovations and positive for
non-drastic innovations.
(III) The licensing policy at the SPNE is given as follows, where θ(b, a− c) := `(b)(a− c).
(a) If ε ≤ θ(b, a− c), the licensing policy has royalty ε and no fixed fee.
(b) If ε > θ(b, a − c), ∃ rb(ε) ∈ (0, ε) such that the licensing policy has royalty rb(ε)
and fixed fee α = pi2(rb(ε))− pi2 > 0. The royalty rate rb(ε) is decreasing in b.
To see the intuition of this result, first consider a non-drastic innovation. Under the pure
royalty policy r = ε, the effective marginal cost of firm 2 becomes µε(q) + ε = µ(q), as in the
case of no licensing. This implies that quantities and prices under licensing and no licensing
are identical. Hence the profit of firm 1 is the same under these two regimes, i.e., pi1(ε) = pi1.
Positive royalty revenue tilts the scale in favor of licensing for firm 1. This shows technology
transfer is generally optimal for non-drastic innovations.
For drastic innovations, firm 1 can become a monopolist by using the innovation exclu-
sively, but still it prefers to license to its rival. This is because under decreasing returns to
scale, production of a large output by a single firm creates cost inefficiencies. Hence firm 1
has incentive to keep firm 2 in the market: the presence of two active firms increases efficiency
and results in higher surplus than the monopoly profit, which firm 1 then extracts via a fixed
fee.
Optimal combinations of fees and royalties are determined by two factors. First, firm 1
intends to create a relatively inefficient rival and second, it has to consider how the rival’s
efficiency affects its own marginal cost. Under decreasing returns these two factors work in
opposite direction as an inefficient rival implies higher output and higher marginal cost for
firm 1. The relation between the magnitude of innovation and the strength of decreasing
returns plays an important role to resolve this conflict, as we explain below.
Note that the threshold θ(b, a − c) is decreasing in b. So the result of Proposition 1(III)
can be restated in terms of b. If b is low then the impact of decreasing returns on firm
1’s marginal cost is relatively low, so the incentive of creating an inefficient rival is more
important. Accordingly, a pure royalty policy with maximum royalty equal to ε is used.
If b is high, the impact of decreasing returns is high and firm 1 prefers to provide a certain
degree of cost efficiency to firm 2 to ensure that firm 1 avoids operating in relatively inefficient
production zones. For this reason the rate of royalty is set below ε. This also explains why the
royalty rate rb(ε) is decreasing in b. Higher values of b means firm 1 faces higher marginal
cost. By designing a royalty that decreases in b, firm 1 “commits” to a relatively smaller
quantity, thus staying in a relatively efficient production zone.
3 Post-licensing price
Now we study how the post-licensing price behaves in relation to the strength of diseconomies
of scale (represented by b). Proposition 2 identifies a paradox. Using optimal licensing
policies, we find ranges of parameter values under which an increase in b lowers market price.
Proposition 2 Let p0(b) be the post-licensing Cournot price in the SPNE of Gb. There exist
ε̂ ∈ (0, a− c) and b̂ > 0 such that
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(I) If 0 < ε ≤ ε̂, p0(b) is increasing for all b > 0.
(II) If ε̂ < ε < a− c, ∃ b˜(ε) ∈ (0, b̂) such that p0(b) is increasing for b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)), decreasing
for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing for b > b̂.
(III) If ε ≥ a− c, p0(b) is decreasing for b ∈ (0, b̂) and increasing for b > b̂.
Let r∗(b) be the optimal royalty for firm 1. By Proposition 1, r∗(b) ∈ {ε, rb(ε)}. Let the
industry output be Q∗ = Q(b, r∗(b)). An increase in b creates a direct and an indirect effect
on Q∗: the first effect captures the standard impact of an increase in marginal cost and has
a negative sign. The second effect operates via the royalty rate. The overall marginal effect
of b on Q∗ (given by dQ∗/db) can be decomposed as
dQ∗/db = ∂Q∗/∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂Q∗/∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· ∂r∗/∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
50
(8)
If r∗(b) = ε, the indirect effect of b is zero and the industry output decreases (so price
increases) in b. If r∗(b) = rb(ε), (8) becomes
dQ∗/db = ∂Q∗/∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂Q∗/∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· ∂rb(ε)/∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(9)
In this case, the indirect effect is positive as an increase in b reduces the level of royalty. As
a result of the two opposite effects, the industry output is an inverse u-shaped function in b,
so the price is a u-shaped function of b.
The ranges identified in Proposition 2 are driven by optimal licensing policies. Recall by
Proposition 1 that if the magnitude of innovation is low, the optimal royalty is ε for any b.
So for small innovations, price increases in b. If the magnitude of innovation is large, the
royalty is rb(ε) for any b; then the price is u-shaped in b. For intermediate magnitudes of
the innovation, the royalty is ε for small values of b and it is rb(ε) for large values of b. As
a result, price is increasing when b is relatively small and it is u-shaped when b is relatively
large.
Remark Our comparative statics exercise has focused on changes of b. Alternatively, we
could examine the constant term c of the marginal cost line. The impact on industry output
would again be captured by an expression similar to (8). However, in this case the direct
effect would always dominate the indirect effect.
4 Pareto-improving taxes
In this section we restrict to cases where the post-licensing price p0(b) is decreasing in b. Let
ε > ε̂ and define
b(ε) :=
{
b˜(ε) if ε̂ < ε < a− c
0 if ε ≥ a− c (10)
By Proposition 2, if ε > ε̂, then p0(b) is decreasing for b ∈ (b(ε), b̂). In what follows, we show
that in this case it is possible to design a quantity tax that lowers the post-licensing market
price. Moreover this tax generates sufficient revenue to offset the potential losses of firms
from this taxation.
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Let t(q) be a tax policy that applies to any firm, that is, any firm that sells q units has
to pay tax t(q). Let us take
t(q) = τq2/2 where τ > 0 (11)
As t′(q) = τq > 0 for q > 0, the marginal tax under tax policy (11) is increasing in q, i.e., this
tax policy is progressive. It has the effect of raising each firm’s marginal cost by τq, so the
strategic interaction between the firms under tax policy (11) is the same as the interaction
when there is no tax but the marginal costs under old and new technologies are (b+ τ)q + c
and (b+ τ)q + c− ε. Accordingly, under tax policy (11) firms play the extensive-form game7
Gb+τ . Denoting by p
τ (b) the post-licensing price under tax policy (11), we conclude that
pτ (b) = p0(b+ τ) (12)
For i = 1, 2, let qτi be the quantity and Π
τ
i the payoff of firm i at the SPNE of Gb+τ . Let S
τ
be the sum of payoffs of firms 1, 2 and T τ the tax revenue at the SPNE, i.e.,
Sτ := Πτ1 + Π
τ
2 and T
τ := τ [(qτ1 )
2 + (qτ2 )
2]/2 (13)
Note that S0 and T 0 correspond to the values when there is no tax (i.e., τ = 0); in particular,
T 0 = 0.
Definition A tax and transfer scheme, denoted by (t(.), f1, f2), is a scheme under which any
firm i = 1, 2: (i) pays quantity tax according to function t(q) and (ii) receives a lump-sum
transfer fi.
Proposition 3 Let ε > ε̂, τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) and b ∈ Iτ ≡ (b(ε), b̂− τ). The introduction of tax
(11) has the following effects.
(I) pτ (b) < p0(b), i.e., the tax lowers the post-licensing price.
(II) There exists τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) such that for all τ ∈ (0, τ):
(i) Sτ < S0 i.e., the tax reduces the sum of payoffs of two firms. Consequently it
makes one or both firms worse off.
(ii) T τ > S0−Sτ i.e., the tax generates sufficient revenue to offset the sum of losses
of firms from the tax.
(iii) There exists a tax and transfer scheme (t(.), f1, f2) where firm i = 1, 2 pays tax
according to (11) and receives a lump-sum transfer fi such that (a) the scheme
makes consumers better off compared to no taxes, (b) Πτi +fi > Π
0
i for i = 1, 2 i.e.,
the scheme makes both firms better off compared to no taxes and (c) f1+f2 = T
τ ,
i.e., the scheme is deficit-neutral.
Remark Observe by Proposition 3(II)(i) that tax (11) makes at least one firm worse off. If it
makes both firms worse off, then any tax and transfer scheme satisfying Proposition 3(II)(iii)
must have positive lump-sum transfer for both firms, i.e., fi > 0 for i = 1, 2. However, if tax
(11) makes firm i better off and firm j worse off, then fi could be negative (i.e. i might be
required to make a lump-sum transfer, which together with the tax revenue will compensate
for the losses of j), but i would still be better off compared to no taxes.
7Recall that when there are no taxes, the game played between two firms with existing technology
(1) and new technology (2) is given by Gb, whose SPNE has been characterized in Proposition 1.
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The quantity tax essentially strengthens the diseconomies of scale and consequently lowers
the rate of optimal royalty. The tax has two effects on the market price: (i) the direct effect
by strengthening diseconomies of scale and (ii) the indirect effect by lowering the rate of
royalty. Proposition 3 shows that the indirect effect dominates and the market price falls.
The increase in the industry output allows the government to collect sufficient revenue in order
to compensate the firms. As a result this tax-transfer scheme is strictly Pareto improving: it
improves welfare of consumers as well as firms.
One question that arises is whether we can have Pareto-improving tax transfer schemes
with a linear quantity tax, that is, a tax policy where the tax rate is constant in the quantity
of each firm. Take for example the tax policy t(q) = τq. Then the market price will again be
affected by τ via two channels. However, the net effect will always be such that the price is
increasing in τ , so the result cannot be reproduced with a linear tax.
To conclude, considering a Cournot duopoly model with technology transfer, we have
shown that under optimal licensing policies, higher diseconomies of scale can benefit con-
sumers in terms of lower prices. Using this result we have proposed simple tax-transfer
schemes that enhance welfare without incurring any deficit. Technology transfer across firms
via licensing is quite frequent in practice. Our analysis suggests that in designing policies, it
will be useful to adequately consider the role of licensing.
Appendix
Let i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. By (3) and (4), the profit function of firm i is
pii = (a− qi − qj)qi − (c− δ)qi − bq2i /2 (14)
for some δ ∈ [0, ε] where (a) for i = 1, δ = ε and (b) for i = 2, δ = 0 if firm 2 does not have
a license and δ = ε− r ∈ [0, ε] if it has a license with royalty r.
Lemma A1 Suppose firm i has profit function (14) for some δ ∈ [0, ε]. For any b > 0, firm
i has a unique best response to any quantity qj chosen by its rival firm j, given as
Bδ(qj) =
{
(a− c+ δ − qj)/(b+ 2), if qj ∈ [0, a− c+ δ)
0, if qj ≥ a− c+ δ (15)
Proof Follows by standard computations.
Lemma A2
(i) The monopoly problem where the monopolist has the new technology has a unique solu-
tion. The monopoly price is pM = c+ [(b+ 1)(a− c)− ε]/(b+ 2), the monopoly quantity
is qM = (a−c+ε)/(b+2) and the monopoly profit is piM = (b+2)[qM ]2/2. Furthermore,
pM T c⇔ ε S (b+ 1)(a− c).
(ii) Suppose firm 2 has a license under rate of royalty r. The resulting Cournot duopoly game
has a unique NE. Let p(r) be the Cournot (NE) price and qi(r), pii(r) be the Cournot
quantity, profit of firm i = 1, 2.
(a) If ε < (b + 1)(a − c), then p(r) = c + [(b + 1)(a − c) − 2ε + r]/(b + 3); q1(r) =
[(b+1)(a−c+ε)+r]/(b+1)(b+3), q2(r) = [(b+1)(a−c+ε)−(b+2)r]/(b+1)(b+3) and
pii(r) = (b + 2)[qi(r)]
2/2 for i = 1, 2. Furthermore, p(r), q1(r), pi1(r) are increasing
and q2(r), pi2(r) are decreasing in r.
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(b) If ε ≥ (b+1)(a−c), then there exists rb(ε) ≡ (b+1)(a−c+ε)/(b+2) ∈ (0, ε] such that
if r ∈ [0, rb(ε)) NE price, outputs and profits are same as in (a). If r ∈ [rb(ε), ε],
then firm 2 does not produce and p(r) = pM , q1(r) = qM , i.e, a monopoly is created
with firm 1.
(c) For ε < (b+ 1)(a− c), q1(r)q2(r) is decreasing for r ∈ [0, ε]; for ε ≥ (b+ 1)(a− c),
q1(r)q2(r) is decreasing for r ∈ [0, rb(ε)] and q1(r)q2(r) = 0 for r ∈ [rb(ε), ε].
(iii) Suppose firm 2 does not have a license. The resulting Cournot duopoly game has a
unique NE. Let p̂ be the Cournot price and q̂i be the Cournot quantity for i = 1, 2.
(a) If ε < (b+1)(a−c), then p̂ = c+[(b+1)(a−c)−ε]/(b+3) > c; q̂1 = [(b+1)(a−c)+
(b+ 2)ε]/(b+ 1)(b+ 3), q̂2 = [(b+ 1)(a− c)− ε]/(b+ 1)(b+ 3) and pii = (b+ 2)[q̂i]2/2
for i = 1, 2.
(b) If ε ≥ (b+ 1)(a− c), then p̂ = pM ≤ c. Firm 2 does not produce and a monopoly is
created with firm 1.
(c) pii(ε) = pii for i = 1, 2 and p(ε) = p̂.
Proof (i) Follows by standard computations.
(ii) By Lemma A1, the best response function of firm 1 to q2 is B
ε(q2). If firm 2 has
a license with rate of royalty r, its best response function to q1 is B
ε−r(q1). The results of
(a)-(b) follow by solving the system of two best response equations. To prove (c), let ρ(r) :=
q1(r)q2(r). Using the expressions of q1(r), q2(r) from (a)-(b), observe that whenever ρ(r) > 0,
it is an inverse u-shaped quadratic function. Noting that ρ′(0) = −(a− c+ ε)/(b+ 3)2 < 0,
it follows that ρ′(r) < 0 for r ≥ 0, which proves the result.
(iii) As before, the best response function of firm 1 is Bε(q2). If firm 2 does not have
a license, its best response function is B0(q1). The results of (a)-(b) follow by solving the
system of two best response equations. The result of (c) follows by noting that Bε−r(q1)
equals B0(q1) when r = ε.
Let Fb(p) be the profit of the monopolist under the new technology (2) evaluated at price
p, i.e.,
Fb(p) := (p− c+ ε)Q− bQ2/2 where Q = max{a− p, 0} (16)
As pi1(r) = p(r)q1(r) − (c − ε)q1(r) − b[q1(r)]2/2 and pi2(r) = p(r)q2(r) − (c − ε + r)q2(r) −
b[q2(r)]
2/2, denoting Q(r) := q1(r) + q2(r) to be the industry output, from (6) we have
Π1(r) = (p(r)− c+ ε)Q(r)− b[(q1(r))2 + (q2(r))2]/2− pi2
Using (16) in the expression above, it follows that
Π1(r) = Fb(p(r)) + bq1(r)q2(r)− pi2 (17)
Since firm 2 obtains pi2 in any SPNE of Gb, it follows from (17) that if the royalty rate is r
in an SPNE of Gb, then the sum of payoffs of two firms is
Π1(r) + Π2(r) = Fb(p(r)) + bq1(r)q2(r) (18)
Proof of Proposition 1 (I) To prove part (I), we consider two cases.
Case 1 ε ≥ (b + 1)(a − c) (drastic innovations): For this case without a license firm
2 obtains zero profit and firm 1 becomes a monopolist, i.e., pi2 = 0 and pi1 = piM . By
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Lemma A2(ii)(b), ∃ rb(ε) ∈ [0, ε] such that if 1 chooses r ∈ [rb(ε), ε], then Π1(r) = pi1 = piM .
Therefore it is sufficient to consider policies with r ∈ [0, rb(ε)].
Using the results of Lemma A2 in (17), it follows that
Π′1(r) = [(b+ 1)
2(a− c+ ε)− h(b)r]/(b+ 1)2(b+ 3)2 where h(b) := (b+ 2)(b2 + 4b+ 1) (19)
Since h(b) > 0, we have
Π′1(r) T 0⇔ r S rb(ε) ≡ (b+ 1)2(a− c+ ε)/h(b) > 0 (20)
As rb(ε) − rb(ε) = b(b + 1)(b + 3)(a − c + ε)/h(b) > 0, we conclude that over r ∈ [0, rb(ε)],
the unique maximum of Π1(r) is attained at r = rb(ε). Thus, in particular, Π1(rb(ε)) >
Π1(rb(ε)) = piM . This proves that it is optimal for firm 1 to license to firm 2 with rate of
royalty r = rb(ε) and fee pi2(rb(ε)) − pi2 = pi2(rb(ε)) > 0. This proves the result for drastic
innovations.
Case 2 ε < (b + 1)(a − c) (non-drastic innovations): By Lemma A2(iii)(c), pii = pii(ε)
for i = 1, 2. In particular, if firm 1 does not license, it obtains pi1 = pi1(ε). If it offers a
license with royalty r = ε, then by (6), firm 1 obtains Π1(ε) = pi1(ε) + εq2(ε) + pi2(ε)− pi2 =
pi1(ε) + εq2(ε) > pi1(ε) (since q2(ε) > 0 for a non-drastic innovation). This proves that it is
optimal for firm 1 to offer a license to firm 2 for non-drastic innovations. This completes the
proof of (I).
(II) Note by the discussion preceding equation (6) that α = pi2(r)− pi2, so firm 2 obtains
pi2. The last statement of (II) follows by noting that pi2 = 0 if the innovation is drastic and
pi2 > 0 if the innovation is non-drastic.
(III) For the case ε ≥ (b+ 1)(a− c), the (unique SPNE) licensing policy has been already
characterized in Case 1 of the proof of part (I). So consider ε < (b + 1)(a − c). Applying
Lemma A2(ii)(a) in (17), in this case Π′1(r) satisfies (19) and (20) for any r ∈ [0, ε]. Observe
that ε− rb(ε) = w(b)[ε− `(b)(a− c)]/h(b) where `(b) is given in (7) and h(b) is given in (19).
Hence ε T rb(ε)⇔ ε T `(b)(a− c).
If ε > `(b)(a−c), then ε > rb(ε) and by (20), the unique maximum of Π1(r) is attained at
r = rb(ε); the resulting fixed fee is pi2(rb(ε))−pi2 = pi2(rb(ε))−pi2(ε) (since pi2(r) is decreasing
and rb(ε) < ε, the fee is positive). This proves the result for `(b)(a− c) < ε < (b+ 1)(a− c).
Together with Case 1 of the proof of (I), this characterizes SPNE licensing policy for ε >
`(b)(a − c) (part (III)(b)). Using the expression of rb(ε) from (20), its properties follow by
standard computations.
If ε ≤ `(b)(a− c), then rb(ε) ≥ ε and by (20), the unique maximum of Π1(r) is attained
at r = ε where the fixed fee is pi2(ε) − pi2 = pi2(ε) − pi2(ε) = 0. This proves the result for
ε ≤ `(b)(a− c) (part (III)(a)).
Proof of Proposition 2 Recall that p(r) = c+[(b+1)(a−c)−2ε+r]/(b+3) is the Cournot
price with royalty r when both firms are active in the market. Then,
p0 =
{
p(rb(ε)) if ε > `(b)(a− c)
p(ε) if ε ≤ `(b)(a− c) (21)
Noting that rb(ε) = (b+ 1)
2(a− c+ ε)/(b+ 2)(b2 + 4b+ 1), it follows that
∂p(rb(ε))/∂b = y(b)(a− c+ ε)/[h(b)]2 where y(b) := 2b4 + 10b3 + 15b2 + 4b− 1
and there exists b̂ ∈ (0.15, 0.16) such that ∂p(rb(ε))/∂b T 0 ⇔ b T b̂. We consider the
following cases.
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Case 1 ε ≥ a − c: Since `(0) = 1 and `(b) is decreasing, for this case ε > `(b)(a − c)
for all b > 0 and by (21), p0 = p(rb(ε)). So for this case, p
0 is decreasing for b ∈ (0, b̂) and
increasing for b > b̂ which proves (III).
Case 2 0 < ε < a− c: Since `(0) = 1, `(b) is decreasing and limb→∞ `(b) = 0, there exists
b˜(ε) > 0 such that ε T `(b)(a− c)⇔ b T b˜(ε). From the properties of `(b), it follows that b˜(ε)
is decreasing with limε↑a−c b˜(ε) = 0 and limε↓0 b˜(ε) =∞. Therefore, there exists ε̂ ∈ (0, a− c)
such that b̂ S b˜(ε)⇔ ε S ε̂.
Case 2(a) 0 < ε ≤ ε̂: For this case, b̂ ≤ b˜(ε). If b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)], then ε ≤ `(b)(a− c) and by
(21), p0 = p(ε), which is increasing in b. If b > b˜(ε), then ε > `(b)(a − c) and p0 = p(rb(ε))
which is increasing in b (since b > b˜(ε) ≥ b̂). By continuity of p0 it follows that p0 is increasing
for all b > 0. This proves (I).
Case 2(b) ε̂ < ε < a− c: For this case, b̂ > b˜(ε). If b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)], then ε ≤ `(b)(a− c) and
p0 = p(ε), which is increasing in b. If b > b˜(ε), then ε > `(b)(a−c) and p0 = p(rb(ε)), which is
decreasing for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing otherwise. Therefore for this case p0 is increasing
for b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)), decreasing for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing for b > b̂. This proves (II).
Lemma A3 Let τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) and b ∈ Iτ ≡ (b(ε), b̂− τ). Consider the functions given in
(13) and define U τ to be the sum of tax revenue and payoffs of the firms at the SPNE. As
functions of τ, Sτ is decreasing and T τ , U τ are both increasing at τ = 0.
Proof As the SPNE price of Gb+τ is p
0(b + τ), from (18) it follows that the sum of payoffs
of firms at the SPNE is
Sτ = Fb+τ (p
0(b+ τ)) + bqτ1q
τ
2 (22)
where Fb(p) is given in (16). Since b + τ ∈ (b(ε), b̂), from the proof of Proposition 2 we
know that at the SPNE of Gb+τ , firm 1 sets royalty rb+τ (ε) where rb(ε) is given in (20). The
quantities qτ1 , q
τ
2 and the price p
0(b + τ) is obtained from Lemma A2(ii) by replacing b by




[τ = 0] = −κ(b)(b+ 1)(2b3 + 6b2 + 3b+ 1) < 0,
dT τ
dτ
[τ = 0] = κ(b)(2b4 + 10b3 + 15b2 + 6b+ 1) > 0,
dU τ
dτ
[τ = 0] = κ(b)2b(b2 + 3b+ 1) > 0
This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 3 (I) For any b ∈ Iτ , both b, b + τ ∈ (b(ε), b̂) and by Proposition 2,
p0(b+ τ) < p0(b). Using (12), it follows that pτ (b) = p0(b+ τ) < p0(b).
(II) Since as function of τ, Sτ is decreasing and U τ is increasing at τ = 0 (by Lemma
A3), there exists a sufficiently small τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) such that for all τ ∈ (0, τ):
Sτ < S0 and U τ > U0 (23)
The first inequality of (23) proves (i). As U τ = Sτ + T τ and T 0 = 0, the last inequality of
(23) implies
T τ > S0 − Sτ = (Π01 −Πτ1) + (Π02 −Πτ2) (24)
which proves (ii).
Since lump-sum transfer do not affect market prices, (iii)(a) is immediate from (I). Denote
T τ−(S0−Sτ ) ≡ d > 0 and take fi = Π0i −Πτi +d/2 for i = 1, 2. Then Πτi +fi = Π0i +d/2 > Π0i
for i = 1, 2 and by (24), f1 + f2 = S
0 − Sτ + d = T τ . This proves (b) and (c).
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